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Abstract	  




This	  research	  centers	  on	  the	  question	  of	  ‘Who	  wins?’	  in	  criminal	  and	  civil	  cases	  heard	  by	  
West	  Virginia’s	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeals.	  The	  study	  examines	  litigant	  characteristics	  and	  
whether	  court	  winners	  are	  favored	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  higher	  organizational	  levels,	  such	  as	  
being	  business	  or	  government	  affiliates.	  The	  study	  is	  a	  partial	  small-­‐scale	  replication	  of	  the	  
prior	  research	  by	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  (1992)	  who	  determined	  that	  litigation	  resources	  
that	  resulted	  from	  higher	  organizational	  levels	  predicated	  higher	  win	  rates	  in	  the	  United	  
States	  Courts	  of	  Appeals.	  I	  utilized	  an	  array	  of	  cross-­‐tabulations	  of	  success	  and	  litigant	  
organization	  for	  a	  two-­‐year	  sample	  of	  appeals	  (N=434)	  and	  also	  compared	  winning	  with	  a	  
measure	  of	  organizational	  superiority.	  Results	  garnered	  support	  for	  the	  theoretical	  
proposition	  of	  Donald	  Black	  (1976),	  which	  states	  that	  law	  will	  react	  more	  harshly	  toward	  
less	  organization,	  and	  more	  favorably	  toward	  more	  organization.	  Study	  findings	  suggest	  
that	  higher	  organizational	  levels	  did	  realize	  greater	  success	  for	  litigants	  in	  West	  Virginia’s	  
appellate	  courts	  for	  the	  2011-­‐2012	  term.	  The	  study	  also	  utilized	  a	  more	  detailed	  and	  
complex	  approximation	  of	  litigant	  organizational	  levels	  that	  may	  be	  useful	  in	  further	  
research	  exploring	  the	  relationship	  of	  organization	  with	  court	  success.	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   1	  
Introduction	  
	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Jurisprudence	  holds	  the	  precept	  that	  all	  are	  equal	  before	  the	  law,	  and	  in	  theory	  legal	  rules	  are	  
applied	  universally,	  although	  scholars	  and	  sociologists	  long	  have	  thought	  this	  righteous	  ideal	  of	  
legal	  equality	  to	  be	  a	  myth.	  Marx	  and	  Engels	  (1955	  [1848])	  suggest	  that	  all	  institutions	  in	  society	  
systematically	  uphold	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  elite	  or	  ruling	  class.	  	  Reiman	  (1995)	  also	  purports	  that	  the	  
rich	  perpetuate	  a	  status	  quo	  of	  inequality	  between	  the	  classes	  through	  law	  and	  the	  criminal	  justice	  
system,	  and	  the	  public	  sees	  a	  distorted	  image	  of	  crime	  as	  being	  primarily	  an	  act	  of	  the	  poor.	  He	  
points	  out	  that	  even	  the	  term	  “crime”	  is	  applied	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  reflect	  this:	  “It	  (crime)	  is	  
primarily	  reserved	  for	  the	  dangerous	  actions	  of	  the	  poor,”	  pointing	  out	  that	  when	  deaths	  occur	  due	  
to	  negligence	  of	  corporate	  interests,	  they	  are	  called	  accidents,	  not	  crimes	  (Reiman	  1995:58-­‐59).	  The	  
common	  tendency	  is	  for	  law	  and	  order	  to	  be	  viewed	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  monetary	  stratification,	  
but	  many	  (including	  this	  author)	  argue	  there	  is	  more	  to	  the	  matter.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  his	  classic	  work,	  The	  Power	  Elite,	  C.W.	  Mills	  (1956)	  presented	  a	  more	  precise	  assessment	  of	  the	  
social	  order.	  Mills	  said	  that	  explanations	  that	  purport	  that	  society	  is	  ruled	  by	  economic	  or	  political	  
forces	  alone	  are	  actually	  overly	  simplistic.	  He	  described	  a	  “power	  elite”	  who	  compose	  a	  political,	  
economic,	  and	  military-­‐industrial	  complex	  that	  exerts	  influence	  over	  society	  by	  nature	  of	  status	  and	  
association.	  Mills	  said	  that	  a	  relatively	  small	  but	  powerful	  and	  organized	  “big	  three”	  network	  
interchanges	  its	  members.	  Sometimes	  corporate	  officials	  will	  change	  jobs	  to	  political	  or	  military	  
positions,	  and	  often	  the	  latter	  two	  groups	  will	  exchange	  staff	  with	  corporate	  firms.	  Mills	  suggested	  
that	  in	  the	  United	  States	  this	  reign	  of	  the	  power	  elite	  began	  as	  early	  as	  the	  American	  Revolution	  and	  
proceeded	  through	  the	  time	  of	  his	  writing,	  after	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II	  (Mills	  1956:6,	  268-­‐79).	  
Were	  he	  alive	  today,	  one	  may	  speculate	  that	  Mills	  would	  attribute	  the	  current	  state	  of	  affairs	  with	  
its	  cronyism	  and	  unfair	  dealings	  to	  the	  power	  elite.	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   2	  
	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	  cronyism	  and	  an	  “old	  boy”	  network	  are	  ideas	  not	  too	  distant	  from	  the	  context	  of	  Mills’	  
and	  others’	  writings.	  There	  is	  an	  adage	  known	  in	  some	  circles	  that	  says	  that	  all	  goings-­‐on	  in	  West	  
Virginia	  are	  political	  except	  for	  politics,	  which	  is	  personal.	  With	  a	  small	  economy,	  smaller	  towns	  and	  
only	  one	  law	  school	  and	  two	  large	  universities	  there	  are	  few	  or	  no	  degrees	  of	  social	  separation	  
among	  the	  populace.	  For	  instance,	  Heather	  Bresch,	  daughter	  of	  former	  West	  Virginia	  governor	  now	  
U.S.	  Senator	  Joe	  Manchin,	  retroactively	  ‘earned’	  an	  executive	  MBA	  degree,	  having	  completed	  only	  22	  
of	  the	  48	  required	  credits,	  ten	  years	  after	  the	  last	  date	  of	  her	  university	  attendance.	  After	  an	  
inquiry,	  Bresch’s	  degree	  was	  rescinded,	  and	  a	  university	  president,	  a	  provost,	  and	  two	  deans	  of	  the	  
West	  Virginia	  University	  School	  of	  Business	  resigned	  over	  the	  matter	  (Urbina	  2008).	  According	  to	  
an	  investigative	  report,	  the	  dean	  and	  provost	  acted	  on	  insufficient	  information	  in	  granting	  the	  
degree,	  and	  due	  to	  “…Ms.	  Bresch’s	  high	  profile…she	  was,	  in	  fact,	  treated	  in	  an	  unusual	  and	  unique	  
manner”	  relative	  to	  other	  MBA	  candidates	  at	  the	  time	  (WVU	  2008:10,15).1	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  a	  separate	  2008	  case	  before	  the	  West	  Virginia	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeals,	  Chief	  Justice	  Elliott	  
Maynard,	  acting	  in	  response	  to	  a	  court	  order,	  recused	  himself	  from	  a	  $50M	  securities	  fraud	  lawsuit	  
being	  appealed	  by	  coal	  company	  Massey	  Energy.	  The	  judge	  initially	  had	  voted	  in	  a	  3-­‐2	  decision	  
favoring	  Massey,	  whose	  CEO,	  Don	  Blankenship,	  is	  Maynard’s	  long-­‐time	  friend.	  Incidentally,	  
Blankenship	  currently	  faces	  a	  30-­‐year	  sentence	  for	  combined	  federal	  fraud	  indictments	  for	  this	  
incident	  and	  also	  for	  negligence	  and	  fraud	  charges	  surrounding	  the	  2010	  Big	  Branch	  Mine	  disaster	  
that	  killed	  29	  in	  West	  Virginia.	  Despite	  millions	  of	  dollars	  in	  fines,	  Massey	  Energy	  survived	  
relatively	  unscathed,	  recently	  purchased	  for	  some	  $7.1	  billion	  by	  competitor	  Alpha	  Natural	  
Resources.	  Some	  might	  argue	  that	  Massey’s	  role	  was	  in	  “taking	  the	  fall”	  for	  the	  coal	  company;	  
nonetheless	  he	  was	  able	  to	  obtain	  a	  three-­‐month	  reprieve	  to	  the	  start	  of	  his	  criminal	  proceedings.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  statement	  was	  made	  in	  response	  to	  the	  investigative	  panel’s	  question	  on	  whether	  Ms.	  Bresch	  had	  been	  
treated	  the	  same	  as	  other	  MBA	  candidates	  considered	  at	  the	  times	  of	  her	  enrollment	  and	  her	  retrospective	  
degree	  awardship.	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Though	  the	  “official”	  reason	  for	  filing	  the	  reprieve	  motion	  was	  a	  high	  volume	  of	  case	  paperwork,	  the	  
multi-­‐millionaire	  former	  CEO	  of	  Massey	  earned	  this	  initial	  pause	  in	  a	  case	  yet	  to	  ultimately	  be	  
decided.	  (Liptak	  2008;	  Pearson	  and	  Milford	  2015).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  While	  corporate	  or	  political	  affiliations	  may	  earn	  favor	  before	  the	  law,	  fame	  and	  fortune	  may	  
also	  help.	  In	  the	  well-­‐known	  O.J.	  Simpson	  criminal	  case,	  the	  national	  football	  icon	  and	  sports	  
commentator	  was	  acquitted	  of	  all	  charges,	  despite	  DNA	  evidence	  linking	  him	  to	  the	  murders	  of	  his	  
wife	  and	  acquaintance.	  Even	  a	  civil	  suit	  targeting	  Simpson	  failed	  to	  take	  hold	  for	  several	  years	  
before	  its	  merits	  were	  finally	  heard.	  Simpson	  hired	  9	  legal	  advisors	  for	  his	  murder	  trial,	  one	  of	  
whom	  was	  successful	  Harvard	  professor	  and	  Constitutional	  lawyer,	  Alan	  Derschowitz,	  who	  in	  his	  
legal	  career	  successfully	  exonerated	  some	  of	  the	  wealthiest	  and	  highest	  profile	  criminal	  defendants.	  
The	  average	  defendant	  cannot	  afford	  to	  pay	  for	  such	  expensive	  private	  counsel	  or	  legal	  advisors.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  2011	  in	  another	  criminal	  case,	  country	  music	  superstar	  Willie	  Nelson’s	  near	  ½	  pound	  drug	  
possession	  resulted	  in	  a	  mere	  $500	  fine	  for	  a	  (reduced)	  “paraphernalia”	  charge,	  and	  after	  30	  days	  
even	  this	  charge	  dropped	  from	  Nelson’s	  permanent	  record	  due	  to	  his	  “staying	  out	  of	  trouble”	  for	  a	  
month.	  Nelson	  had	  several	  prior	  drug	  possession	  arrests	  for	  which	  he	  served	  no	  jail	  time,	  including	  
a	  2006	  charge	  for	  possession	  of	  1.5	  pounds	  of	  marijuana	  and	  several	  ounces	  of	  hallucinogenic	  drugs	  	  
(Duke	  2011).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  While	  in	  some	  cases	  celebrities,	  the	  wealthy,	  and	  the	  organizationally	  affiliated	  may	  get	  legal	  
favor	  when	  they	  need	  it,	  other	  cases	  involve	  extreme	  civil	  liberties	  violations	  committed	  by	  
government	  entities	  or	  officers	  who	  may	  be	  devoid	  of	  serious	  consequences.	  For	  instance,	  in	  2014	  
in	  the	  mostly	  African-­‐American	  town	  of	  Ferguson,	  Missouri,	  police	  took	  the	  life	  of	  unarmed	  18-­‐year-­‐
old	  black	  resident,	  Michael	  Brown,	  who	  was	  shot	  six	  times	  and	  killed	  after	  resisting	  arrest.	  Officer	  
Wilson,	  the	  shooter,	  later	  avoided	  indictment	  for	  misconduct.	  In	  the	  following	  months,	  amidst	  
nationwide	  riots,	  events	  culminated	  in	  a	  federal	  investigation,	  the	  resignation	  of	  police	  personnel,	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and	  the	  subsequent	  protesting	  and	  firearm	  assaults	  against	  police.	  Perhaps	  most	  important	  to	  the	  
Ferguson	  incident	  is	  the	  US	  Justice	  Department	  investigation	  that	  uncovered	  many	  civil	  rights	  and	  
fining	  violations.	  According	  to	  that	  report,	  Ferguson	  police	  issued	  50%	  more	  municipal	  citations—
some	  90,000-­‐-­‐during	  the	  2014	  fiscal	  year,	  while	  serious	  crimes	  such	  as	  theft	  and	  DUI	  remained	  
constant.	  Officer	  evaluations	  depended	  on	  the	  issuance	  of	  tickets	  in	  what	  equates	  to	  a	  quota	  system,	  
and	  findings	  suggested	  that	  police	  practices	  operated	  to	  generate	  revenue	  and	  reflected	  both	  racial	  
bias	  and	  stereotyping	  (US	  Department	  of	  Justice	  2015:6-­‐10;15).	  In	  nearby	  Washington,	  D.C.	  
unconstitutional	  seizures	  of	  funds	  and	  assets	  are	  so	  commonplace	  that	  police	  announce	  plans	  for	  
the	  use	  of	  anticipated	  seizures	  prior	  to	  their	  acquisition.	  All	  over	  the	  United	  States	  (including	  
Ferguson,	  Missouri)	  police	  are	  using	  seized	  funds	  to	  purchase	  costly	  equipment	  and	  resources	  in	  a	  
process	  known	  as	  “Equitable	  Sharing.”	  	  (Washington	  Post	  2014).	  
	  	  	  	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  government	  officials	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  a	  capitalist	  or	  power	  elite,	  
organizational	  position	  does	  hold	  some	  legal	  advantage.	  One	  might	  consider	  for	  illustration	  a	  case	  
close	  to	  home.	  In	  2013,	  in	  Martinsburg,	  West	  Virginia,	  police	  shot	  African-­‐American	  Wayne	  Jones	  23	  
times…killing	  him.	  Allegedly	  causing	  an	  officer	  what	  amounted	  to	  a	  flesh	  wound,	  Jones,	  suffering	  
from	  schizophrenia,	  had	  characteristically	  avoided	  police	  and	  ignored	  questioning	  over	  his	  walking	  
the	  street.	  Authorities	  left	  Jones’	  lifeless	  body	  uncovered	  for	  four	  hours,	  while	  the	  officer	  was	  
treated	  and	  released	  from	  the	  scene	  immediately.	  None	  of	  the	  officers,	  who	  allegedly	  altered	  the	  
video	  of	  the	  shooting,	  were	  indicted	  for	  misconduct.	  The	  Berkeley	  County	  Circuit	  Court	  dismissed	  a	  
$200M	  lawsuit,	  and	  Jones’	  estate	  declined	  a	  subsequent	  $200,000	  settlement	  offer	  (Martinsburg	  
Journal	  2014).	  Perhaps	  this	  dismissal	  is	  another	  case	  whereby	  “the	  powers	  that	  be”	  exercised	  legal	  
advantage.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  If	  favor	  is	  conveyed	  to	  benefit	  the	  wealthy	  or	  affiliated	  and	  not	  to	  the	  poor	  or	  those	  lacking	  
status,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  most	  often	  granted	  to	  members	  of	  the	  proverbial	  “City	  Hall.”	  Whether	  they	  are	  
business	  or	  government	  organizations,	  the	  “haves”	  of	  the	  world	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo,	  winning	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legal	  battles	  through	  their	  influence.	  Additionally,	  consequence	  often	  does	  not	  come	  to	  police	  and	  
legal	  players	  who	  automatically	  have	  a	  certain	  cache-­‐-­‐a	  governmental	  employer,	  a	  heavy	  purse,	  or	  
some	  other	  advantage.	  Simply	  having	  the	  ability	  to	  hire	  one’s	  own	  attorney	  is	  advantageous,	  
especially	  with	  over-­‐burdened	  court-­‐funded	  attorneys,	  who	  serve	  as	  the	  constitutional	  guarantor	  of	  
legal	  “fairness”	  through	  provision	  of	  legal	  representation	  for	  all.	  Clout	  may	  be	  just	  what	  wins	  in	  the	  
world	  of	  legal	  pugilism,	  and	  being	  able	  to	  hire	  expensive	  legal	  counsel	  is	  a	  commodity	  not	  afforded	  
by	  all.	  However,	  I	  assume	  in	  this	  article	  that	  organizational	  status	  is	  the	  key	  factor	  to	  legal	  favor.	  My	  
work	  investigates	  how	  the	  law	  treats	  individuals	  and	  organizations	  differently.	  	  	  
	  
Theoretical	  Framework	  and	  Literature	  Review	  
	  	  	  	  	  
Donald	  Black	  and	  the	  Law	  
	  	  	  	  The	  framework	  of	  this	  article	  originates	  in	  Donald	  Black’s	  theory	  of	  law.	  In	  his	  book,	  The	  Behavior	  
of	  Law	  (1976),	  he	  describes	  law	  as	  governmental	  social	  control.	  	  As	  differences	  in	  case	  processing	  
are	  attributed	  to	  variations	  in	  law,	  these	  variations	  coincide	  with	  an	  inconsistent	  treatment	  of	  
deviants	  according	  to	  social	  factors.	  Black	  says	  that	  law	  is	  a	  quantitative	  variable	  measurable	  by	  the	  
amount	  of	  action	  of	  the	  law.	  For	  instance,	  a	  call	  to	  the	  police	  is	  one	  level	  of	  legal	  action;	  a	  formally	  
filed	  charge	  is	  another,	  and	  a	  court	  action	  is	  yet	  another.	  Additionally,	  each	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  
legal	  scenarios	  represents	  a	  different	  degree	  of	  action,	  or	  quantity	  of	  law.	  A	  phone	  call	  is	  less	  law	  
than	  an	  arrest,	  and	  an	  arrest	  is	  less	  law	  than	  a	  court	  sentence,	  and	  so	  forth.	  Relative	  to	  law	  and	  its	  
varying	  quantitative	  degrees,	  Black	  says	  that	  other	  factors	  may	  coincide	  with	  the	  various	  actions	  
and	  the	  subsequent	  “behavior”	  of	  law.	  Additionally,	  this	  behavior	  depends	  on	  its	  context.	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“Social	  Geometry”	  and	  Covariates	  of	  Law	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Black	  defines	  social	  geometry	  as	  “…	  location	  and	  direction	  in	  social	  space.”	  (Black	  1976:184).	  
Accordingly,	  he	  says	  that	  law	  varies	  by	  the	  social	  geometry	  of	  individual	  legal	  cases.	  For	  example,	  in	  
two	  technically	  identical	  third	  degree	  murder	  cases,	  litigant	  characteristics	  and	  case	  details	  like	  the	  
differing	  statuses	  (cultural,	  socioeconomic	  or	  otherwise)	  of	  victim	  and	  offender	  often	  drive	  
different	  outcomes.	  Legal	  cases	  involving	  socially	  upward	  crimes	  (those	  committed	  by	  a	  lower	  
status	  perpetrator	  against	  a	  higher	  status	  victim)	  will	  attract	  a	  greater	  quantity	  of	  law	  and	  likewise	  
the	  opposite.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  category	  of	  crimes	  occurring	  from	  a	  higher	  status	  perpetrator	  
against	  a	  lower	  status	  victim	  will	  attract	  less	  law	  and	  typically	  less	  severe	  consequences	  (Black	  
1976:19,	  85-­‐86).	  For	  instance,	  if	  a	  criminal	  has	  a	  lower	  educational	  level	  than	  a	  victim,	  the	  legal	  
punishment	  may	  be	  greater	  than	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  criminal	  is	  the	  more	  educated	  of	  the	  two.	  When	  
a	  criminal	  is	  more	  educated	  the	  law	  will	  yield	  a	  more	  favorable	  outcome,	  perhaps	  a	  reduced	  
sentence	  or	  even	  an	  acquittal.	  As	  such,	  and	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  above	  example,	  in	  a	  third	  degree	  
murder	  case	  wherein	  a	  law	  professor	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  death	  of	  a	  student	  (who	  we	  will	  assume	  
is	  the	  less-­‐educated)	  the	  professor	  will	  more	  likely	  than	  not	  receive	  some	  legal	  favor	  or	  less	  harsh	  
penalty,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  situation	  when	  the	  same	  crime	  occurs	  from	  the	  opposite	  direction	  (in	  other	  
words	  when	  a	  student	  is	  found	  responsible	  for	  the	  death	  of	  the	  more	  educated,	  higher	  status	  
professor).	  	  
Organization	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  A	  fundamentally	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  legal	  case	  is	  the	  organization	  of	  its	  litigants.	  According	  
to	  Black,	  organization	  is	  a	  quantitative	  variable	  that	  can	  predict	  legal	  favor.	  As	  such,	  he	  observed	  
and	  also	  devised	  measures	  of	  organization	  in	  his	  studies	  of	  the	  law.	  With	  regard	  to	  litigant	  status	  
and	  of	  particular	  theoretical	  importance	  to	  the	  current	  study,	  Black	  defines	  organization	  as	  a	  
quantitative	  variable,	  a	  “…capacity	  for	  collective	  action…found	  in	  any	  group”	  (Black	  1976:85).	  He	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instructs	  the	  reader	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  collective	  potential	  can	  be	  measured,	  saying	  that	  
organization	  will	  “…include	  presence	  and	  number	  of	  administrative	  officers…and	  decision-­‐making,	  
and	  the	  quantity	  of	  collective	  action	  itself”	  (Black	  1976:85-­‐86).	  By	  virtue	  of	  this	  quantitative	  aspect	  
of	  his	  definition	  of	  organization,	  Black	  predicts	  that	  the	  law	  will	  generally	  favor	  those	  present	  in	  
numbers	  and	  those	  of	  superior	  organizational	  capacity.	  Thus	  an	  individual	  is	  less	  organized	  than	  
two	  or	  more	  individuals,	  who	  are	  in	  turn	  less	  organized	  than	  a	  small	  business,	  which	  is	  less	  
organized	  than	  the	  state	  government,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  While	  much	  can	  be	  said	  about	  Black’s	  theory	  of	  law	  and	  different	  covariates	  of	  legal	  action,	  this	  
study	  focuses	  primarily	  to	  test	  Black’s	  proposition,	  “Law	  is	  greater	  in	  a	  direction	  toward	  less	  
organization	  than	  toward	  more	  organization”	  (1976:92).	  This	  proposition	  suggests	  that	  the	  higher	  
is	  one’s	  organizational	  level,	  the	  better	  will	  be	  his	  or	  her	  probability	  of	  legal	  success	  and	  the	  less	  
likely	  the	  potential	  for	  loss.	  This	  means	  that	  in	  court,	  organizations	  (businesses,	  governments,	  etc.)	  
will	  always	  have	  a	  higher	  likelihood	  for	  success	  than	  individuals.	  Stated	  another	  way,	  criminal	  
appeals	  by	  individuals	  will	  more	  likely	  favor	  the	  (implied)	  governmental	  opponent,	  and	  civil	  cases	  
likewise	  are	  be	  expected	  to	  favor	  organizations	  over	  individuals.	  For	  example,	  there	  are	  often	  
higher	  penalties	  for	  criminal	  offenses	  committed	  against	  US	  Postal	  service	  (theft,	  vandalism,	  and	  
the	  like)	  than	  for	  equivalent	  crimes	  directed	  against	  lesser	  government	  affiliates	  such	  as	  state	  
boards	  of	  education	  and	  schools;	  similarly,	  one	  faces	  higher	  penalties	  for	  offenses	  against	  police	  
and	  other	  governmental	  representatives	  than	  for	  equivalent	  crimes	  against	  less	  organized	  affiliates	  
or	  individuals	  (Black	  1976:85-­‐87).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Why	  might	  organizations	  have	  such	  an	  advantage?	  In	  his	  groundbreaking	  essay,	  “Why	  the	  Haves	  
Come	  Out	  Ahead:	  Speculations	  on	  the	  Limits	  of	  Legal	  Change,”	  Marc	  Galanter	  (1974)	  adds	  to	  the	  
theoretical	  framework	  the	  current	  study	  explores.	  Galanter	  claims	  that	  organizations	  such	  as	  
business	  and	  governmental	  litigants	  are	  more	  often	  what	  he	  coins	  “repeat	  players”	  in	  the	  court	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system,	  while	  individuals	  are	  usually	  “one-­‐shotters.”	  	  The	  one-­‐shotter	  is	  someone	  having	  entry-­‐
level	  court	  experience,	  such	  as	  the	  plaintiff	  (or	  defendant)	  in	  personal	  injuries	  cases,	  the	  divorcee,	  
the	  drunk	  driver,	  and	  so	  on.	  Conversely,	  a	  “repeat	  player”	  is	  the	  more	  advantaged	  litigant	  in	  the	  
sense	  that	  he	  or	  she	  somehow	  has	  better	  chances	  for	  success,	  either	  by	  being	  more	  accustomed	  to	  
transacting	  business	  in	  court	  or	  in	  having	  some	  level	  of	  status	  granting	  other	  legal	  advantages.	  For	  
example,	  Galanter	  points	  out	  that	  business	  party	  repeat	  players	  enjoy	  advantages	  by	  virtue	  of	  
benefits	  accessible	  via	  their	  existing	  employees:	  	  
“RPs	  develop	  expertise	  and	  have	  ready	  access	  to	  specialists…RPs	  may	  enjoy	  access	  to	  
competent	  paraprofessional	  help	  that	  is	  unavailable	  to	  OSs	  (one-­‐shotters)…Thus	  the	  
insurance	  company	  can	  by	  employing	  adjusters,	  obtain	  competent	  and	  experienced	  help	  in	  
routine	  negotiations	  without	  resorting	  to	  expensive	  professionally-­‐qualified	  personnel”	  
(1974:98).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Repeat	  players	  are	  generally	  those	  of	  higher	  status	  and	  are	  thus	  dominant	  parties	  in	  court.	  They	  
have	  greater	  stability	  and	  success,	  and	  by	  virtue	  of	  ongoing	  legal	  involvement	  or	  of	  recognized	  
status,	  they	  navigate	  the	  legal	  realm	  with	  few	  or	  no	  setbacks	  and	  a	  net	  gain.	  In	  the	  sense	  that	  repeat	  
players	  have	  more	  experience,	  they	  can	  “play	  by	  the	  rules”	  that	  matter	  most	  to	  winning;	  this	  means	  
that	  they	  can	  find	  the	  legal	  loopholes	  and	  play	  their	  cases	  from	  such	  angles	  in	  order	  to	  succeed.	  The	  
repeat	  player	  is	  able	  to	  utilize	  legal	  rules	  that	  make	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  most	  practical	  sense:	  they	  
“…are	  more	  able	  to	  discern	  which	  rules	  are	  likely	  to	  ‘penetrate’	  and	  which	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  remain	  
mere	  symbolic	  commitments”	  (Galanter	  1974:103).	  Galanter	  is	  referring	  to	  this	  privileged	  access	  
that	  repeat	  players	  have	  to	  legal	  rules	  that	  allow	  their	  success,	  by	  nature	  of	  their	  experience	  and	  
resources,	  in	  a	  system	  that	  is	  only	  formally	  designed	  to	  equally	  favor	  both	  parties.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Galanter’s	  argument	  does	  not	  suggest	  there	  is	  a	  conspiratorial	  effort	  by	  those	  in	  power	  to	  
dominate	  those	  who	  are	  not;	  alternately	  he	  points	  out	  that	  the	  advantages	  conveyed	  to	  those	  of	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status	  are	  not	  granted	  automatically:	  The	  advantages	  of	  repeat	  players	  are	  normative	  to	  the	  actual	  
legal	  process;	  there	  is	  no	  favor	  conveyed	  by	  secret	  handshakes	  or	  judge	  chamber	  meetings,	  and	  
status	  does	  not	  automatically	  guarantee	  success.	  The	  repeat	  player	  enjoys	  advantages	  resulting	  
from	  both	  assets	  and	  knowledge	  that	  go	  with	  his	  or	  her	  high	  status	  as	  well	  as	  from	  experience	  and	  
familiarity	  with	  the	  court	  system.	  Several	  empirical	  studies	  tested	  the	  theoretical	  propositions	  of	  
Black	  and	  sought	  evidence	  for	  Galanter’s	  discussion	  regarding	  status-­‐based	  legal	  advantage.	  
	  
Previous	  Studies	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  his	  research-­‐based	  article,	  “The	  Public	  Ordering	  of	  Private	  Relations,”	  Craig	  Wanner	  (1975)	  
suggests	  that	  the	  law	  is	  a	  tool	  manipulated	  by	  the	  advantaged,	  and	  it	  may	  serve	  to	  promote	  or	  
sustain	  institutional	  discrimination.	  His	  study’s	  results	  seem	  to	  affirm	  the	  idea	  that	  law	  favors	  
organization	  via	  less-­‐than-­‐impartial	  actions	  (Wanner	  1975).	  
	  	  	  	  Wanner	  studied	  city	  court	  civil	  trials	  from	  Baltimore,	  Milwaukee,	  and	  Cleveland	  from	  1971	  to	  
1972	  and	  sampled	  cases	  from	  court	  archives	  for	  the	  years	  1965	  to	  1970	  (N=7800).	  Wanner	  coded	  
data	  by	  case	  type,	  outcome,	  date,	  litigant,	  attorney,	  number	  of	  proceedings	  per	  case,	  monetary	  
amounts	  disputed	  and	  damages	  awarded.	  He	  examined	  case	  styles	  by	  frequency,	  organizational	  
class	  wins,	  and	  by	  city.	  He	  later	  performed	  factor	  analyses	  of	  successes	  and	  examined	  cases	  
according	  to	  litigant	  class	  combinations:	  individual	  versus	  business	  and	  individual	  versus	  
government.	  The	  results	  characterized	  the	  have-­‐nots	  primarily	  as	  individuals	  and	  the	  haves	  as	  
businesses	  and	  corporations,	  as	  well	  as	  government	  entities.	  Business	  and	  government	  plaintiffs	  
and	  defendants	  had	  the	  highest	  win	  rates;	  these	  high	  status	  members	  were	  also	  better	  prepared	  for	  
funding	  litigations	  and	  for	  handling	  losses,	  and	  were	  better	  accommodated	  and	  facilitated	  by	  the	  
court	  when	  filing	  motions.	  (Wanner	  1975).	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  Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  (1992)	  also	  question	  winning	  as	  regards	  litigant	  organizational	  status	  in	  their	  
own	  study	  on	  the	  haves	  and	  have-­‐nots,	  which	  yielded	  more	  support	  for	  Black’s	  proposition	  that	  
higher	  organization	  is	  favored	  through	  legal	  advantage.	  The	  study	  examines	  a	  large	  caseload	  
(N=4281)	  from	  the	  Fourth,	  Seventh,	  and	  Eleventh	  circuits	  of	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Courts	  of	  Appeals	  
combined	  (for	  1988).	  	  The	  authors’	  dichotomy	  of	  inequality	  named	  “upperdogs,”	  and	  “underdogs”	  
as	  the	  haves	  and	  the	  have-­‐nots,	  respectively,	  creating	  a	  special	  set	  of	  subcategories	  of	  
organizational	  levels	  to	  consider	  success	  to	  both	  the	  poor	  and	  to	  the	  privileged.	  They	  also	  generally	  
examined	  four	  classes	  of	  organization	  in	  terms	  of	  success.	  These	  were	  individuals,	  businesses,	  local	  
and	  state	  governments,	  and	  federal	  government.	  All	  other	  litigants	  were	  designated	  as	  a	  class	  
named	  ‘other’	  and	  included	  voluntary	  memberships,	  nonprofits,	  schools,	  and	  political	  
organizations;	  these	  were	  not	  included	  in	  the	  authors’	  analysis	  of	  the	  four	  level	  litigant	  
classification.	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  found	  that	  upperdogs	  (the	  haves)	  nearly	  always	  came	  out	  ahead	  
and	  were	  so	  acclimated	  to	  the	  court	  system	  that	  they	  were	  often	  even	  able	  to	  engage	  in	  forum	  
shopping	  for	  the	  potentially	  most	  profitable	  legal	  battles,	  even	  deciding	  which	  civil	  cases	  were	  
worthy	  of	  a	  fight	  and	  which	  were	  better	  to	  seek	  a	  settlement.	  Their	  study	  relates	  a	  winning	  
advantage	  for	  the	  privileged	  (typically	  those	  of	  a	  higher	  status	  than	  individuals).	  
	  	  	  	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  also	  examined	  win	  rates	  for	  different	  scenarios	  in	  which	  litigants	  of	  different	  
levels	  of	  organization	  were	  matched	  as	  court	  opponents.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  authors	  were	  able	  to	  
generalize	  about	  the	  different	  types	  of	  matchups,	  as	  well	  as	  determining	  each	  litigant	  type’s	  win	  
rate	  as	  either	  appellant	  or	  respondent.	  Further,	  each	  litigant	  class’s	  rate	  of	  success	  was	  reported	  in	  
terms	  of	  a	  relative	  advantage	  measure	  computed	  by	  subtracting	  from	  an	  appellant’s	  success	  rate	  
that	  of	  its	  opponents	  when	  that	  appellant	  class	  appeared	  as	  respondent;	  this	  measure	  reflected	  
individual	  organizational	  class	  advantages	  independent	  of	  the	  effect	  caused	  by	  the	  tendency	  of	  the	  
appeals	  courts	  to	  affirm	  (in	  the	  current	  study	  upwards	  of	  90%).	  According	  to	  the	  research	  of	  Songer	  
and	  Sheehan,	  The	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  data	  also	  showed	  a	  net	  advantage	  for	  federal	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government	  of	  45.1%,	  followed	  by	  local	  and	  state	  governments	  at	  29.0%,	  with	  businesses	  at	  only	  
1.6%	  and	  individuals	  at	  nearly	  18%,	  clearly	  indicating	  an	  organizational	  advantage	  (Songer	  and	  
Sheehan	  1992:242-­‐243).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Though	  I	  do	  not	  incorporate	  their	  method	  in	  the	  current	  study,	  Songer,	  Kuersten,	  and	  Kaheny	  
(2000)	  expanded	  the	  research	  question	  of	  who	  wins	  in	  court	  by	  considering	  whether	  amici	  curiae	  
(literally	  “friends	  of	  the	  court”)	  involvement	  had	  any	  effect	  on	  state	  supreme	  courts	  decisions.	  They	  
focused	  specifically	  on	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  advantaged	  did	  not	  always	  win.	  The	  researchers	  studied	  
data	  from	  three	  separate	  state	  appellate	  courts	  for	  the	  years	  1983-­‐1990:	  North	  Carolina,	  South	  
Carolina,	  and	  Georgia.	  Utilizing	  20	  randomly-­‐selected	  civil	  and	  criminal	  cases	  sourced	  from	  
Westlaw	  with	  a	  stratified	  random	  sample	  of	  cases	  taken	  from	  the	  Southeastern	  Reporter,	  they	  
examined	  all	  cases	  with	  regard	  to	  winning	  when	  amicus	  persons	  filed	  briefs	  on	  behalf	  litigants,	  both	  
when	  filing	  on	  behalf	  of	  appellants	  and	  also	  respondents.	  The	  researchers	  found	  that	  amicus	  
involvement	  was	  helpful	  both	  to	  “upper	  dogs”	  and	  “underdogs,”	  but	  ultimately	  it	  was	  most	  
beneficial	  to	  “underdogs.”	  	  This	  occurred	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  it	  “leveled	  the	  playing	  
field”	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  (Songer,	  Kuersten,	  and	  Kaheny	  2000).	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  consideration	  of	  the	  research	  studies	  just	  mentioned,	  the	  current	  study	  aims	  to	  further	  
examine	  how	  organization	  influences	  case	  outcome	  in	  West	  Virginia’s	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeals.	  
Few	  studies	  have	  examined	  the	  relationship	  with	  a	  recent	  case	  sample,	  and	  to	  date	  none	  have	  
focused	  specifically	  on	  West	  Virginia.	  As	  such,	  the	  current	  study	  aims	  to	  address	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  
literature	  by	  selecting	  from	  a	  new	  data	  set	  to	  test	  the	  theoretical	  proposition	  that	  law	  reacts	  least	  
favorably	  toward	  those	  having	  lower	  organizational	  status	  and	  conversely	  predicates	  a	  higher	  
relative	  success	  for	  those	  of	  higher	  levels	  of	  organization.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  current	  study	  presents	  another	  important	  question	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  West	  Virginia	  
appellate	  court:	  “Do	  civil	  cases	  differ	  from	  criminal	  ones	  as	  regards	  equitable	  treatment?”	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According	  to	  Black’s	  theoretical	  argument	  one	  would	  expect	  that	  since	  higher	  levels	  of	  organization	  
are	  associated	  with	  higher	  court	  success	  and	  legal	  favor,	  the	  criminal	  case	  will	  have	  the	  greatest	  
degree	  of	  difference	  between	  litigants:	  government	  (the	  highest	  order	  of	  organization)	  against	  
individuals	  (the	  least	  organized).	  Accordingly,	  cases	  of	  this	  style	  will	  somewhat	  consistently	  reflect	  
a	  harsher	  consequence	  of	  law	  toward	  individuals.	  Conversely,	  civil	  cases	  often	  involve	  varying	  
degrees	  of	  organizational	  difference,	  and	  as	  such	  will	  reflect	  more	  variation	  in	  overall	  appellant	  
success,	  certainly	  better	  than	  for	  criminal	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  opposing	  government	  party	  can	  
usually	  expect	  to	  win.	  For	  instance,	  a	  divorced	  couple	  may	  litigate	  in	  a	  civil	  matter	  over	  disputed	  
assets	  in	  a	  partnered	  business,	  or	  a	  disgruntled	  employee	  may	  sue	  over	  wrongful	  dismissal	  and	  
wage	  garnishment.	  Perhaps	  a	  civil	  class	  of	  individuals	  will	  litigate	  against	  an	  organization	  or	  
government	  agency,	  or	  a	  business	  may	  file	  suit	  against	  a	  government	  regulatory	  firm,	  or	  some	  
similar	  scenario.	  As	  such,	  in	  the	  civil	  case,	  where	  the	  degree	  of	  organizational	  difference	  between	  
parties	  varies,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  that	  appellant	  parties	  will	  generally	  enjoy	  more	  equitable	  
treatment	  by	  the	  law	  than	  in	  cases	  of	  government	  versus	  individuals	  (criminal	  matters).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Though	  the	  success	  differential	  for	  civil	  style	  cases	  versus	  criminal	  ones	  may	  not	  seem	  
immediately	  important,	  further	  examination	  may	  urge	  some	  consideration	  for	  legal	  reform.	  In	  
comparing	  the	  current	  compulsory	  criminal	  justice	  system	  with	  the	  currently	  optional	  nature	  of	  a	  
civil	  one,	  Black	  (1976)	  suggests	  there	  is	  much	  potential	  for	  change,	  utilizing	  as	  example	  the	  
Japanese	  legal	  system	  as	  one	  that	  is	  perhaps	  better	  than	  our	  current	  one	  and	  not	  so	  inundated	  with	  
inequity.	  Galanter	  (1974)	  also	  gives	  serious	  consideration	  to	  legal	  restructurings	  in	  his	  writings.	  
The	  goal	  of	  such	  reforms	  is	  to	  facilitate	  greater	  equality	  among	  litigants,	  and	  this	  notion	  again	  
reminds	  the	  reader	  that	  such	  idealized	  egalitarianism	  is	  merely	  a	  supposition	  upon	  which	  the	  legal	  
system	  is	  already	  based.	  The	  true	  state	  of	  affairs	  as	  revealed	  by	  data	  here	  and	  elsewhere	  may	  be	  an	  
impetus	  for	  judicial	  overhaul.	  Rousseau	  referred	  to	  the	  need	  for	  a	  periodic	  legislative	  equalization,	  
which	  in	  the	  present	  day	  could	  arguably	  justify	  all-­‐out	  reforms.	  “It	  is	  precisely	  because	  the	  force	  of	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circumstances	  tends	  continually	  to	  destroy	  equality	  that	  the	  force	  of	  legislation	  should	  always	  tend	  to	  its	  
maintenance”	  (Rousseau	  2010[1910]:39-­‐40).	  	  
	  
Data	  Source	  and	  Selected	  Cases	  
	  
The	  West	  Virginia	  Supreme	  Court	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  West	  Virginia	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  is	  the	  state’s	  highest	  court.	  It	  hears	  criminal,	  civil,	  
and	  administrative	  cases	  appealed	  from	  county	  circuit	  courts,	  just	  as	  county	  courts	  are	  also	  
responsible	  for	  hearing	  cases	  successfully	  appealed	  from	  town	  and	  municipal	  courts.	  Cases	  affirmed	  
by	  the	  West	  Virginia	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  are	  in	  turn	  the	  legal	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  US	  Supreme	  
Courts	  of	  Appeals,	  though	  cases	  in	  such	  scenarios	  are	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study.	  As	  is	  the	  case	  
with	  the	  data	  utilized	  here,	  the	  majority	  of	  state-­‐level	  appeals	  are	  decided	  in	  finality	  by	  state	  
appellate	  courts,	  never	  reaching	  the	  federal	  level	  of	  appeals.	  As	  such	  the	  judicial	  body	  whose	  cases	  I	  
examine	  in	  the	  current	  study	  is	  the	  terminal	  point	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  successfully	  appealed	  cases	  in	  
the	  state.	  I	  remind	  the	  reader	  here	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  appeals	  cases	  are	  affirmed	  (the	  request	  in	  
the	  appeal	  is	  denied);	  therefore	  most	  appeals	  go	  no	  further	  than	  the	  court	  hearing	  the	  appeal.	  The	  
Mountain	  State’s	  highest	  court	  also	  hears	  cases	  raised	  by	  governmental	  organizations	  for	  
administrative	  decisions,	  such	  as	  those	  of	  the	  West	  Virginia	  Department	  of	  Education,	  the	  
Department	  of	  Motor	  Vehicles	  (DMV),	  as	  well	  as	  those	  of	  both	  the	  West	  Virginia	  Bar	  Association	  and	  
the	  Lawyer	  Judiciary	  Board.	  Additionally,	  the	  court	  oversees	  worker’s	  compensation	  issues	  and	  
those	  of	  other	  administrative	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Department	  of	  Environmental	  Protection.	  	  
Case	  Dispositions	  and	  Opinions	  
	  	  	  	  Case	  dispositions	  for	  the	  West	  Virginia	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  are	  organized	  as	  opinions	  
publicly	  available	  in	  a	  database	  of	  accessible	  via	  the	  website	  www.courtswv.gov/supreme-­‐
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court/opinions.html.	  Opinions	  in	  the	  database	  document	  court	  decisions	  regarding	  civil,	  criminal	  
and	  administrative	  matters;	  these	  include	  detailed	  case	  synopses.	  The	  database	  archives	  opinions	  
issued	  from	  1991	  to	  the	  present	  day	  for	  cases	  originating	  in	  West	  Virginia’s	  fifty-­‐five	  counties.	  Case	  
styles	  include	  civil	  actions,	  criminal	  proceedings,	  and	  administrative	  matters.	  Civil	  actions	  include	  
torts,	  real	  property,	  and	  contract	  law	  matters.	  Criminal	  actions	  involve	  various	  crime	  types,	  
including	  the	  criminal	  categories	  utilized	  by	  the	  FBI’s	  Uniform	  Crime	  Reporting	  (UCR)	  index.	  Issues	  
not	  in	  the	  scope	  of	  sampled	  cases	  include	  Lawyer	  and	  Judiciary	  Board	  matters	  and	  those	  of	  the	  WV	  
Bar	  Association,	  as	  well	  as	  certified	  questions	  issued	  by	  federal	  or	  non-­‐WV	  courts,	  and	  
administrative	  and	  worker’s	  compensation	  matters.	  One	  can	  search	  the	  database	  by	  case	  number,	  
names	  of	  litigants,	  or	  by	  biannual	  terms	  in	  chronological	  order	  of	  occurrence.	  	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Case	  dispositions	  are	  classified	  in	  several	  ways,	  including	  signed	  opinions	  (SO),	  also	  called	  “slip	  
opinions”;	  memorandum	  decisions	  (MD);	  per	  curiam	  opinions	  (PC)	  (also	  published	  separately	  for	  
reference	  as	  legal	  precedents	  listed	  in	  the	  West	  Virginia	  court	  reports);	  concurring	  or	  dissenting	  
opinions	  (SEP)	  are	  also	  in	  the	  archive	  as	  separate	  files	  submitted	  by	  single	  justices	  of	  the	  five-­‐judge	  
appellate	  panels.	  The	  latter	  have	  no	  bearing	  on	  the	  sampled	  cases	  upon	  which	  they	  are	  based,	  and	  
as	  such	  I	  do	  not	  include	  these	  cases	  in	  the	  study,	  due	  to	  their	  being	  for	  being	  ‘split’	  decisions	  (not	  
‘win’	  or	  ‘lose’	  outcomes).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Case	  opinions	  contain	  a	  detailed	  array	  of	  additional	  information	  including	  dates	  of	  appeal	  and	  
counties	  from	  where	  appeals	  originate;	  names	  of	  appellants	  (bringers	  of	  appeals)	  and	  respondents	  
(their	  opponents);	  reason	  for	  appeal;	  original	  case	  details,	  lower	  trial	  court	  decision,	  and	  written	  
arguments	  and	  syllabus	  points	  (in	  signed	  opinions)	  of	  justices.	  Outcomes	  are	  listed	  as	  “affirmed,”	  
“reversed	  and	  remanded,”	  “reversed,”	  “remanded,”	  “vacated,”	  “reversed	  and	  vacated,”	  and	  
“dismissed.”	  Reversed”	  means	  prior	  decisions	  are	  overturned	  by	  the	  West	  Virginia	  Supreme	  Court	  
of	  Appeals.	  “Remanded”	  means	  a	  prior	  decision	  is	  nullified	  and	  returned	  to	  the	  original	  court	  venue	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(often	  with	  instructions)	  for	  decision.	  “Dismissed”	  indicates	  that	  the	  current	  appeal	  is	  nullified	  and	  
declared	  as	  unworthy	  of	  further	  discussion.	  “Vacated”	  is	  the	  technical	  equivalent	  of	  “dismissed.”	  
Affirmation	  is	  the	  most	  common	  case	  disposition	  (85.7%	  for	  this	  study),	  and	  as	  already	  stated,	  
courts	  historically	  maintain	  greater	  than	  the	  idealized	  50%	  affirmation	  rate	  that	  might	  exist	  in	  a	  
perfectly	  egalitarian	  legal	  system	  (Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  1992:240),	  perhaps	  reflecting	  a	  somewhat	  
automatic	  deference	  to	  already	  decided	  court	  rulings.	  “	  	  
Case	  Selection	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  this	  study	  I	  selected	  for	  analysis	  only	  affirmed	  or	  reversed	  (or	  dismissed	  or	  vacated)	  criminal	  
and	  civil	  appeals	  cases	  from	  the	  2011-­‐2012	  term	  (N=434).	  I	  did	  not	  include	  in	  the	  analysis	  any	  
partial	  decisions.	  Prior	  studies	  using	  appellate	  courts	  data	  often	  included	  all	  listed	  appeals	  case	  
styles,	  as	  well	  as	  mixed	  outcome	  cases	  (‘affirmed	  in	  part,	  reversed	  in	  part’).	  In	  the	  current	  study	  I	  
limited	  the	  scope	  to	  the	  two	  general	  categories	  of	  appeals:	  criminal	  and	  civil	  actions.	  I	  chose	  to	  
control	  for	  case	  type	  selection	  in	  this	  manner	  for	  several	  reasons,	  with	  primary	  consideration	  given	  
to	  comparing	  the	  size	  of	  organizational	  advantage	  across	  case	  type;	  in	  other	  words,	  allowing	  for	  
administrative	  cases	  and	  family	  law	  matters	  creates	  a	  large	  sample	  caseload	  having	  identical	  
organizational	  levels	  (individual	  v.	  government).	  Though	  controlling	  for	  case	  style	  could	  be	  
accomplished	  through	  statistical	  controls,	  controlling	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  sample	  was	  thought	  most	  
appropriate	  due	  to	  the	  limited	  sample	  size.	  According	  to	  Black’s	  theory,	  comparing	  criminal	  versus	  
civil	  cases	  predicts	  a	  lower	  rate	  of	  success	  for	  the	  former,	  which	  are	  typically	  appealed	  by	  
individuals	  against	  state,	  municipal,	  or	  county	  accusers.	  I	  desired	  a	  better	  view	  of	  organizational	  
variation	  than	  criminal	  cases	  alone,	  and	  thus	  I	  also	  included	  civil	  cases.	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Variables	  and	  Coding	  
	  	  	  	  The	  data	  used	  for	  analysis	  here	  come	  from	  cases	  of	  the	  years	  2011	  through	  2012.	  The	  dependent	  
variable	  ‘winning’	  is	  defined	  according	  to	  the	  case	  dispositions	  referred	  to	  above	  in	  the	  same	  
methodology	  as	  used	  by	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  (1992);	  in	  other	  words,	  a	  success	  is	  coded	  as	  a	  ‘1,’	  
while	  a	  failure	  is	  coded	  ‘0.’	  A	  case	  that	  is	  “affirmed”	  is	  considered	  a	  loss	  for	  purposes	  of	  analysis;	  all	  
others	  are	  wins;	  the	  latter	  can	  include	  dismissals	  or	  vacated	  decisions,	  reversals,	  remands,	  or	  some	  
combination	  thereof.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  here	  that	  independent	  of	  this	  coding	  scheme,	  an	  actual	  loss	  
is	  only	  considered	  as	  such	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  litigant:	  A	  ‘loss’	  to	  an	  appellant	  (an	  affirmed	  
case)	  is	  a	  win	  to	  a	  respondent	  and	  vice	  versa.	  
	  	  	  	  For	  appellants	  and	  respondents	  I	  further	  utilize	  the	  litigant	  organizational	  classes	  used	  by	  Songer	  
and	  Sheehan	  (1992)	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  more	  complicated	  expanded-­‐type	  organizational	  classification	  
strategy.	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  defined	  organizational	  classes	  as	  ‘individuals,’	  ‘businesses,’	  ‘state	  and	  
local	  government,’	  federal	  (national)	  government,’	  and	  ‘other’	  (other	  organizations).	  In	  this	  study,	  I	  
use	  these	  same	  categories,	  except	  for	  ‘national	  government’	  (as	  WV	  appeals	  data	  only	  includes	  state	  
or	  local	  government	  levels	  of	  organization)	  and	  ‘other.’	  In	  addition,	  I	  use	  the	  following	  
organizational	  designations:	  ‘individuals,’	  ‘multiple	  individuals,’	  ‘classes	  (of	  individuals	  or	  parties)’	  
as	  in	  class	  action	  suits,	  ‘small	  businesses’	  and	  ‘large	  businesses,’	  ‘local	  and	  state	  government,’	  and	  
‘voluntary	  organizations’	  for	  membership	  organizations	  or	  trade	  unions.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  
other	  levels	  of	  organization	  do	  exist,	  such	  as	  national	  governments	  and	  other	  authorities	  to	  which	  
governments	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  accountable—for	  example	  the	  United	  Nations’	  (UN)	  International	  
Court	  of	  Justice	  (ICJ).	  Higher	  organizational	  levels	  are	  subject	  matter	  for	  future	  studies,	  and	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  this	  research	  state	  appeals	  courts	  data	  restrict	  organizational	  levels	  by	  only	  dealing	  
with	  litigants	  who	  are	  at	  the	  highest	  category-­‐-­‐state	  government.	  Higher-­‐level	  litigants	  (national	  
government	  status	  or	  higher)	  are	  only	  participants	  in	  tribunals	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States	  Courts	  of	  
Appeals	  or	  the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Courts.	  The	  two	  organizational	  classification	  strategies	  I	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utilize	  in	  the	  current	  study	  both	  line	  up	  with	  Black’s	  theory,	  except	  for	  voluntary	  organizations	  and	  
classes	  in	  the	  expanded-­‐type,	  which	  should	  be	  considered	  with	  caution	  due	  to	  limitations	  unique	  to	  
this	  study	  (e.g.	  too	  few	  such	  observations	  available	  for	  analysis).	  Differences	  in	  the	  two	  
organizational	  scales	  have	  some	  merit	  for	  future	  exploration,	  particularly	  for	  reasons	  of	  possible	  
benefits	  of	  using	  the	  more	  complicated	  expanded-­‐type	  of	  classification,	  which	  I	  will	  discuss	  later.	  
Measures	  of	  Litigant	  Success	  
	  	  	  	  	  Though	  litigant	  classes	  were	  identical	  for	  appellant	  and	  respondent,	  I	  thought	  it	  best	  to	  present	  
an	  expanded	  classification	  type	  in	  this	  study,	  along	  with	  the	  Songer-­‐style	  one.	  This	  more	  
complicated	  scheme	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  important	  in	  considering	  data	  and	  how	  they	  support	  or	  do	  not	  
support	  theoretical	  relationships.	  As	  did	  other	  researchers	  before	  me,	  I	  devised	  an	  index	  of	  net	  
advantage	  among	  different	  parties,	  also	  very	  important	  with	  respect	  to	  litigant	  winning.	  This	  is	  a	  
calculation	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  litigant	  class’s	  success	  as	  appellant	  and	  its	  opponents’	  
success	  when	  the	  former	  is	  appearing	  as	  a	  respondent.	  For	  example,	  to	  calculate	  the	  index	  of	  net	  
advantage	  for	  individuals	  I	  subtract	  the	  total	  success	  rate	  of	  all	  opponents	  when	  individuals	  appear	  
as	  respondents	  from	  the	  overall	  success	  enjoyed	  by	  individuals	  when	  appearing	  as	  appellants;	  the	  
difference	  is	  the	  net	  advantage	  for	  individuals.	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  variable	  is	  that	  it	  indicates	  
success	  for	  an	  organizational	  class	  superior	  to	  its	  raw	  success	  rate	  would	  do.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  measure	  is	  not	  distorted	  by	  the	  relative	  frequency	  that	  a	  class	  appears	  a	  respondent	  or	  
appellant	  when	  considering	  general	  success	  rates	  (affirmation	  rates)	  of	  appeals	  cases,	  which	  
transcend	  litigant	  characteristics.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  an	  organizational	  class	  appears	  in	  court	  more	  
(or	  less)	  as	  a	  respondent	  than	  as	  an	  appellant,	  by	  its	  raw	  success	  rate	  it	  will	  then	  appear	  more	  or	  
less	  successful	  due	  to	  the	  general	  propensity	  for	  courts	  to	  affirm	  (Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  1992:242).	  
With	  the	  current	  study’s	  analysis	  reflecting	  an	  85.7%	  affirmation	  rate	  (chi-­‐squared	  probabilities	  at	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the	  0.001	  level	  or	  better),	  this	  measure	  is	  certainly	  very	  useful,	  perhaps	  even	  more	  so	  with	  
government	  appearing	  as	  the	  respondent	  in	  59%	  of	  cases	  (257	  out	  of	  the	  total	  434	  cases).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Another	  variable	  of	  considerable	  significance	  to	  this	  study	  is	  the	  index	  of	  relative	  strength	  
between	  litigants.	  It	  relates	  directly	  to	  the	  question,	  “To	  what	  degree	  does	  difference	  in	  
organizational	  strength	  predict	  court	  winning?	  Index	  of	  relative	  strength	  is	  important	  because	  it	  
highlights	  the	  degree	  of	  difference	  of	  organizational	  strength	  versus	  the	  favor	  of	  the	  legal	  system	  as	  
indicated	  by	  rate	  of	  court	  success.	  As	  discussed	  below,	  the	  measure	  shows	  whether	  success	  rates	  
increase	  consistently	  with	  incremental	  increases	  in	  organizational	  strength	  according	  to	  the	  
relative	  differences	  in	  strength	  for	  appellants	  versus	  respondents.	  According	  to	  Songer	  and	  
Sheehan,	  a	  linear	  presentation	  of	  this	  organizational	  difference	  in	  relative	  strength	  with	  success	  
supports	  the	  theoretical	  proposition	  that	  higher	  organization	  (and	  a	  higher	  positive	  difference	  in	  
organization	  between	  court	  opponents)	  predicts	  greater	  favor	  of	  the	  law	  (1992:246-­‐247).	  The	  
relative	  strength	  index	  is	  found	  by	  subtracting	  from	  an	  appellant’s	  numeric	  level	  of	  organization	  the	  
opposing	  respondent’s	  corresponding	  organizational	  level	  (for	  each	  coded	  case);	  the	  index	  of	  
relative	  strength	  corresponds	  to	  a	  specific	  court	  success	  rate.	  Before	  one	  can	  calculate	  the	  value	  of	  
this	  variable,	  all	  litigants	  first	  are	  assigned	  a	  numerical	  organizational	  level:	  1,	  2,	  or	  3	  in	  the	  Songer-­‐
type	  scheme	  and	  between	  1	  and	  7	  according	  to	  the	  expanded-­‐type	  organizational	  classification;	  this	  
range	  of	  differences	  and	  corresponding	  success	  rates	  are	  displayed	  in	  Tables	  4a	  and	  4b.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Following	  the	  methods	  of	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan,	  I	  coded	  individual	  litigants	  involved	  by	  virtue	  of	  
their	  official	  roles	  in	  organizations	  at	  the	  levels	  of	  those	  associated	  organizations,	  but	  only	  when	  the	  
individuals’	  court	  involvement	  was	  by	  virtue	  of	  that	  organizational	  association	  (Songer	  and	  
Sheehan	  1992:237-­‐238).	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  litigant	  is	  a	  police	  officer	  whose	  organizational	  title	  is	  
‘Corporal	  First	  Class’	  and	  he	  or	  she	  is	  named	  as	  an	  original	  respondent	  in	  a	  civil	  suit	  against	  the	  
West	  Virginia	  State	  Police,	  the	  variable	  for	  respondent	  is	  coded	  a	  ‘7’	  (local-­‐state	  government).	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Similarly,	  if	  an	  appellant	  or	  respondent	  party	  includes	  more	  than	  one	  individual,	  then	  the	  variable	  
for	  that	  litigant	  is	  coded	  according	  to	  the	  status	  of	  the	  member	  having	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  
organizational	  affiliation.	  In	  the	  previous	  example	  for	  the	  state	  police	  officer,	  the	  litigant	  is	  coded	  as	  
a	  ‘7’	  (state	  government)	  even	  if	  other	  individuals	  or	  businesses	  are	  named	  as	  respondents.	  In	  
another	  example,	  perhaps	  a	  class	  action	  suit	  appealed	  by	  respondents	  John	  and	  Jane	  Smith,	  listing	  
as	  co-­‐litigants	  Jim	  and	  Sally	  McCoy	  and	  the	  Woods	  Resort,	  Inc.,	  the	  corresponding	  appellant	  
organizational	  status	  is	  coded	  according	  to	  the	  highest-­‐status	  organizational	  member,	  in	  this	  case	  
‘4’	  (small	  business),	  since	  the	  resort	  is	  included	  in	  the	  list	  and	  has	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  organization.	  	  
A	  Note	  on	  Appellate	  Courts,	  Case	  Names,	  and	  Appellants	  and	  Respondents	  
	  	  	  	  The	  reader	  should	  also	  be	  aware	  that	  due	  to	  the	  often	  cyclic	  nature	  of	  appeals	  and	  mechanics	  of	  
appellate	  courts,	  when	  a	  decided	  lower	  court	  case	  is	  heard	  as	  an	  appeal	  in	  appellate	  court,	  the	  
‘loser’	  in	  the	  previous	  case	  automatically	  takes	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  appellant	  in	  the	  appeals	  court,	  
regardless	  of	  whether	  previously	  the	  plaintiff	  or	  defendant.	  This	  party	  is	  raising	  the	  appeal,	  and	  
thus	  he	  or	  she	  becomes	  the	  appellant	  in	  the	  higher	  court	  of	  appeals,	  and	  accordingly,	  the	  opponent	  
is	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time	  the	  respondent.	  For	  example,	  a	  lower	  court	  decision	  may	  favor	  Party	  A,	  and	  so	  
Party	  B	  appeals;	  another	  ruling	  follows	  and	  favors	  Party	  B,	  and	  then	  Party	  A	  appeals	  again,	  and	  so	  
on.	  Similarly,	  in	  cases	  involving	  multiple	  entities	  as	  litigants,	  a	  single	  member	  of	  the	  group	  of	  
litigants	  (or	  some	  subset	  thereof)	  may	  initiate	  an	  appeal,	  or	  perhaps	  a	  member	  of	  a	  class	  may	  
initiate	  a	  cross-­‐appeal	  or	  some	  other	  such	  development.	  Worthy	  of	  note	  also	  is	  that	  in	  the	  West	  
Virginia	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeals,	  cases	  may	  still	  be	  titled	  according	  to	  the	  format	  used	  in	  the	  
original	  case	  first	  appearing	  before	  the	  appeals	  courts	  (or	  before	  the	  lower	  courts).	  In	  such	  a	  
scenario,	  the	  title	  format	  may	  be	  Appellant	  v.	  Respondent	  when	  one	  would	  perhaps	  expect	  the	  
appeal	  to	  read	  correctly	  according	  to	  the	  format	  of	  the	  current	  appellant	  and	  respondent.	  For	  
instance,	  for	  an	  appeal	  of	  a	  circuit	  court	  decision	  by	  appellant	  John	  Smith	  against	  ‘State	  of	  West	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Virginia,’	  the	  original	  case	  may	  have	  been	  titled,	  ‘State	  of	  West	  Virginia	  v.	  John	  Smith.’	  The	  case	  to	  be	  
heard	  by	  the	  West	  Virginia	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  may	  still	  remain	  named	  in	  this	  manner:	  State	  
of	  West	  Virginia	  v.	  John	  Smith-­‐-­‐when	  it	  accurately	  should	  read,	  ‘John	  Smith	  v.	  State	  of	  West	  Virginia.’	  
In	  the	  coding	  scheme	  of	  the	  data	  for	  this	  study,	  the	  case	  titles	  sourced	  from	  the	  original	  appellate	  
courts	  database	  have	  likewise	  not	  been	  altered,	  and	  thus	  it	  can	  at	  first	  be	  difficult	  to	  determine	  the	  




H1:	  Court	  success	  rates	  will	  be	  greater	  for	  higher	  organizational	  levels	  than	  for	  lower	  ones.	  
H2:	  An	  organizational	  advantage	  index	  will	  indicate	  that	  the	  higher	  the	  indexed	  difference	  of	  
relative	  degrees	  of	  organization,	  the	  higher	  will	  be	  the	  win	  rate	  for	  the	  dominant	  party.	  	  
H3:	  Generally,	  civil	  appeals	  will	  have	  a	  higher	  success	  rate	  than	  will	  criminal	  appeals.
Analysis	  
	  	  	  	  This	  research	  examines	  litigant	  success	  rate	  according	  to	  seven	  organizational	  categories	  and	  
includes	  a	  condensed	  comparison	  according	  to	  organizational	  levels	  utilized	  in	  the	  Songer	  and	  
Sheehan	  (1992)	  study,	  excluding	  their	  fourth	  measure,	  federal	  government.	  The	  latters’	  
organizational	  levels	  include	  individual,	  business,	  state	  or	  local	  government	  (and	  federal	  
government).	  In	  keeping	  with	  the	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  methodology,	  the	  current	  study	  performs	  a	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set	  of	  similar	  comparisons	  via	  cross-­‐tabulation,	  also	  allowing	  for	  comparisons	  by	  the	  expanded	  
organizational	  category	  scheme	  above	  that	  of	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan,	  as	  mentioned	  above.3	  
Litigant	  Success	  
	  	  	  	  Since	  the	  dependent	  variable	  in	  the	  current	  study	  is	  the	  win	  rate	  for	  WV	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  
Appeals	  litigants	  by	  their	  respective	  organizational	  levels,	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  analysis	  was	  to	  
examine	  these	  rates	  by	  litigant	  classification.	  This	  includes	  both	  the	  expanded-­‐type	  (including	  the	  7	  
stages	  devised	  for	  the	  current	  research)	  and	  the	  modified	  Songer-­‐type.4	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Tables	  1a	  
and	  1b,	  government	  enjoyed	  an	  overall	  60%	  appellant	  success	  rate	  ,	  very	  close	  to	  the	  58.2%	  
reported	  by	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan.	  Next	  came	  business	  with	  34.9%	  overall	  success	  (combining	  the	  
small	  business	  and	  large	  business	  categories	  that	  had	  win	  rates	  of	  25%	  and	  53.8%,	  respectively).	  
Multiple	  individuals	  enjoyed	  about	  double	  (18%)	  the	  appellant	  successes	  of	  single	  individuals,	  
while	  classes	  won	  none	  (0%)	  of	  their	  appeals	  and	  voluntary	  organizations	  won	  one	  of	  two	  times	  
(N=2)	  it	  appeared	  as	  a	  respondent.	  All	  organizational	  party	  winning	  results	  reported	  here	  were	  
generated	  from	  data	  tables	  for	  which	  chi-­‐squared	  tests	  were	  quite	  significant	  (Chi-­‐square=44.92,	  
df=20,	  p<0.01).
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  categories	  of	  organization	  devised	  here,	  voluntary	  organization	  and	  classes	  in	  some	  cases	  produced	  so	  few	  
observable	  scenarios	  that	  the	  decision	  was	  made	  that	  these	  should	  be	  considered	  only	  with	  caution.	  For	  purposes	  
of	  clarity	  I	  left	  them	  intact	  and	  organized	  in	  the	  tables	  that	  follow.	  
4	  The	  implication	  here	  is	  that	  in	  these	  different	  organizational	  classifications	  the	  ‘government’	  category	  
remained	  unchanged	  due	  to	  coding	  including	  only	  one	  litigant	  level	  designated	  ‘government.’	  The	  expanded	  
organizational	  classification	  allowed	  for	  a	  differentiation	  in	  successes	  of	  in-­‐state,	  small	  business	  and	  
interstate,	  large	  business,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  multiple	  individuals	  and	  classes,	  while	  the	  latter	  two	  categories’	  win	  
rates	  are	  reported	  along	  with	  very	  small	  numbers	  of	  observations	  (N=50	  and	  N=3,	  respectively).	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For	  the	  tables	  used	  to	  generate	  the	  data	  in	  the	  tables	  above	  N=434,	  Chi-­‐square=19.16,	  df=4,	  p<0.01.	  
	  
Table	  1b.	  	  Appellant	  Success	  against	  Different	  Respondents	  (‘Expanded-­‐type’	  
Organization)	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Net	  Advantage	  by	  Organizational	  Level	  
	  	  	  	  	  Further	  considering	  litigant	  success,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  discuss	  the	  net	  advantage	  for	  each	  
organizational	  class,	  as	  was	  generally	  outlined	  in	  the	  Variables	  section	  above.	  The	  net	  advantage	  is	  
a	  better	  indicator	  of	  success	  than	  raw	  success	  rates,	  and	  according	  to	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan,	  the	  
reasoning	  is	  simple:	  Net	  advantage	  considers	  court	  success	  independent	  of	  the	  relative	  frequency	  
by	  which	  a	  litigant	  class	  appears	  in	  court	  as	  a	  respondent	  or	  appellant	  (1992:240-­‐241).	  This	  is	  
important	  when	  there	  is	  such	  a	  high	  tendency	  for	  affirmation,	  which	  can	  create	  a	  disproportionate	  
success	  rate,	  especially	  if	  a	  class	  appears	  much	  more	  in	  court	  as	  a	  respondent,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  for	  
government	  parties	  in	  this	  study.	  The	  measure	  is	  also	  particularly	  useful	  because	  the	  affirmation	  
rate	  in	  the	  current	  study	  reached	  85.7%,	  exceeding	  the	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  study,	  which	  reported	  
84%.	  	  The	  significance	  tests	  offered	  further	  support	  for	  this	  finding	  (For	  the	  tables	  from	  which	  this	  
figure	  originates:	  Chi-­‐squared	  44.92,	  df=20,	  p<0.001).	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  Table	  2a	  and	  Table	  2b	  is	  the	  net	  advantage	  of	  each	  organizational	  class,	  showing	  first	  the	  
respondent	  success	  rate	  for	  each	  organizational	  level	  then	  subtracting	  from	  that	  all	  opponents’	  
success	  rates	  when	  the	  class	  was	  a	  respondent.	  Generally	  stated,	  the	  data	  here	  reflect	  positive	  
support	  for	  the	  theoretical	  proposition	  (H1):	  The	  difference	  between	  highest	  and	  lowest	  index	  of	  
net	  advantage	  is	  57.7%	  (by	  the	  expanded	  organizational	  measure)	  and	  60.8%	  (by	  the	  Songer-­‐
type),5	  only	  slightly	  lower	  than	  the	  63.3%	  reflected	  in	  the	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  study.	  This	  
magnitude	  of	  difference	  in	  advantage	  between	  the	  highest	  and	  lowest	  organizational	  levels	  gives	  
fairly	  consistent	  support	  for	  the	  theoretical	  prediction	  that	  greater	  court	  success	  rates	  will	  
accompany	  higher	  organizational	  levels.	  
	  	  	  	  	  As	  said	  before,	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  (1992)	  suggest	  that	  a	  linear	  trend	  between	  success	  and	  
organizational	  level	  is	  expected	  to	  support	  the	  theoretical	  framework,	  but	  the	  net	  advantage	  value	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  These	  figures	  were	  based	  on	  tabulations	  whose	  chi-­‐squared	  tests	  reflected	  a	  0.001	  significance	  or	  better.	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in	  this	  study’s	  results	  actually	  becomes	  more	  negative	  for	  multiple	  individuals	  (-­‐10.6)	  than	  
individuals	  (-­‐6.6),	  conflicting	  with	  a	  linear	  trend.	  Though	  this	  detail	  deviates	  slightly	  from	  the	  linear	  
expectation	  of	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan,	  the	  trend	  for	  net	  advantage	  here	  is	  still	  mostly	  linear	  in	  Table	  
2b	  (Chi-­‐squared=36.74,	  df=12,	  p<0.001)	  and	  nearly	  perfectly	  linear	  in	  Table	  2a.	  The	  gravity	  of	  the	  
aforementioned	  deviation	  (and	  the	  overall	  advantage	  values	  that	  show	  multiple	  individuals	  
accordingly	  slightly	  higher,	  as	  well:	  21.8%	  v.	  20.4%	  in	  Table	  2b)	  must	  also	  be	  considered	  lightly.	  
Fewer	  cases	  existed	  for	  multiple	  individuals	  than	  for	  individuals	  (50	  as	  opposed	  to	  328),	  and	  
furthermore,	  the	  increased	  complexity	  of	  my	  expanded	  organizational	  classification	  strategy	  may	  
point	  to	  another	  relationship	  between	  court	  favor	  and	  organizational	  level.	  Again,	  when	  the	  
organizational	  categories	  for	  net	  advantage	  in	  this	  study	  are	  collapsed	  according	  to	  the	  Songer-­‐style	  
strategy	  (Table	  2a),	  the	  trend	  still	  appears	  linear	  with	  strong	  significance	  (Chi-­‐squared=31.64,	  df=4,	  
p<0.001).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  I	  emphasize	  here	  that	  in	  Table	  2b	  ‘classes’	  realized	  a	  0%	  success	  rate	  as	  both	  appellant	  and	  
respondent,	  though	  this	  finding	  should	  be	  approached	  with	  caution	  because	  so	  few	  cases	  existed	  in	  
which	  this	  organizational	  class	  appeared	  as	  a	  litigant	  (N=3).	  Similarly,	  voluntary	  organizations	  won	  
50%	  of	  the	  time,	  but	  there	  were	  also	  too	  few	  cases	  to	  give	  this	  finding	  much	  credibility	  (N=2).	  Aside	  
from	  the	  aforementioned	  instances	  of	  too	  few	  cases	  for	  serious	  comparison,	  the	  success	  pattern	  in	  
Table	  2b	  is	  generally	  linear	  as	  expected,	  supporting	  the	  proposition	  that	  law	  reacts	  more	  harshly	  
against	  the	  less	  organized.	  Individuals	  succeeded	  exactly	  9.8%	  of	  the	  time,	  while	  multiple	  
individuals	  won	  18%	  of	  cases;	  small	  business	  won	  25%	  of	  the	  time,	  and	  large	  business	  had	  53.8%	  
success,	  while	  government	  again	  came	  out	  on	  top	  with	  60%	  success.	  Significance	  testing	  lends	  
better	  support	  to	  these	  findings	  (Chi-­‐squared=36.74,	  df=12,	  p<0.01)	  and	  further	  support	  to	  this	  
study’s	  test	  that	  law	  will	  better	  favor	  higher	  organizational	  levels	  (H1).	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Combined	  Success	  Rate	  as	  




	  	  	  10.8	  -­‐	  
(381)	  
20.5	  	  	  	  =	  
(83)	  
	  -­‐9.7	   23.1	  	  	  
Business	   35	  	  	  	  	  -­‐	  
(43)	  





Government	   	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  	  	  	  	  -­‐	  
(10)	  





For	  the	  tables	  used	  to	  generate	  the	  data	  in	  the	  tables	  above	  N=434,	  Chi-­‐square=31.64,	  df=4,	  p<0.001.	  
	  
Table	  2b.	  Success	  Rates	  (%)	  by	  Songer-­‐type	  Organization:	  WV	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  
Appeals	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Litigant	  











Combined	  Success	  Rate	  as	  
Appellant	  &	  Respondent	  
%	  
Individual	   9.8-­‐	  
(328)	  
16.4	  	  	  	  	  =	  
(55)	  
	  -­‐6.6	   20.4	  
Multiple	  
Individuals	  
	  18	  	  	  	  -­‐	  
(50)	  
	  28.6	  =	  
(28)	  
	  -­‐10.6	   21.8	  




~	   0	  




-­‐1.9	   26.3	  
Large	  Business	   	  53.8	  	  	  	  -­‐	  
(13)	  
	  19	  =	  
(42)	  














Government	   60	  –	  
(10)	  
8.9	  	  =	  
(257)	  
51.1	   89.9	  
For	  the	  tables	  used	  to	  generate	  the	  data	  in	  the	  tables	  above	  N=434,	  Chi-­‐square=36.74,	  df=12,	  p<0.001.	  
~Indicates	  there	  were	  no	  values	  for	  reporting	  this	  figure/the	  figure	  of	  overall	  success	  as	  appellant	  and	  respondent	  is	  thus	  affected.	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  As	  in	  former	  studies,	  evidence	  supports	  the	  theoretical	  stance	  that	  increased	  organization	  
coincides	  with	  increased	  legal	  favorability	  through	  court	  success	  (Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  1992;	  
Wheeler	  et	  al.	  1987).	  Though	  I	  achieved	  this	  rationale	  via	  a	  general	  array	  of	  cross-­‐tabulations,	  the	  
data	  somewhat	  consistently	  point	  to	  this.	  Individuals	  generally	  succeeded	  less	  than	  all	  other	  
classes,	  and	  government	  was	  likewise	  the	  most	  successful	  of	  litigants.	  Furthermore,	  the	  index	  of	  net	  
advantage	  in	  Table	  2a	  shows	  that,	  independent	  of	  any	  influence	  by	  the	  high	  propensity	  for	  the	  
appeals	  court	  to	  affirm,	  individuals	  still	  are	  substantially	  less	  successful	  than	  higher	  organizational	  
classes.	  Businesses	  in	  turn	  are	  approximately	  twice	  as	  so	  advantaged.	  An	  even	  more	  significant	  
result	  comes	  from	  Table	  2b:	  the	  fact	  that	  government	  is	  about	  eight	  times	  more	  favored	  in	  court	  
according	  to	  its	  net	  advantage	  of	  51.1,	  than	  individuals,	  who	  scored	  a	  mere	  -­‐6.6	  (Chi-­‐
squared=36.74,	  df=12,	  p<0.001).	  The	  results	  here	  and	  in	  the	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  study	  offer	  
support	  for	  Black’s	  proposition	  regarding	  success	  and	  organizational	  strength	  and	  for	  this	  study’s	  
corresponding	  research	  hypothesis	  (H1). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  Table	  3a	  and	  Table	  3b,	  the	  net	  advantage	  measure	  appears	  again,	  listing	  the	  percentage	  
difference	  by	  which	  more	  successful	  parties	  prevailed.	  The	  significance	  here	  is	  that	  unlike	  in	  Tables	  
1a,	  1b,	  2a,	  and	  2b,	  the	  data	  in	  Tables	  3a	  and	  3b	  only	  consider	  cases	  in	  which	  an	  organizational	  class	  
appeared	  against	  other	  classes;	  the	  latter	  tables	  exclude	  cases	  in	  which	  classes	  appeared	  as	  
opponents	  against	  the	  same	  organizational	  level.	  The	  overall	  purpose	  of	  generating	  the	  
comparisons	  in	  Tables	  3a	  and	  3b	  was	  to	  consider	  more	  intensively	  the	  party	  strength-­‐success	  
relationship,	  in	  following	  previous	  researchers	  (Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  1992;	  Wheeler,	  Cartwright,	  
Kagan,	  and	  Freeman	  1987).	  According	  to	  the	  output,	  individuals	  sometimes	  actually	  succeeded	  
against	  slightly	  higher	  levels	  of	  organization,	  particularly	  against	  multiple	  individuals	  and	  against	  
business	  (by	  10%	  and	  by	  2.4%,	  respectively—see	  Table	  3b),	  while	  government	  again	  succeeded	  the	  
most	  when	  appearing	  as	  litigants,	  both	  against	  individuals	  (by	  47%	  and	  42%	  net	  advantage)	  and	  
against	  multiple	  individuals	  (Table	  3b	  only).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Table	  3a	  shows	  the	  expected	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relationships	  with	  business	  and	  government	  succeeding	  consistently	  over	  individuals	  (by	  14.2%	  
and	  47.6%,	  respectively),	  except	  in	  one	  notable	  case	  when	  government	  did	  not	  come	  out	  ahead	  
against	  business;	  business	  succeeded	  over	  government	  by	  a	  33.3%	  higher	  net	  advantage,	  although	  
government	  never	  actually	  took	  on	  businesses	  as	  respondents	  in	  this	  comparison.	  Despite	  this	  
latter	  unexpected	  deviation,	  all	  findings	  in	  Tables	  3a	  hold	  substantial	  significance	  testing	  results	  
(Chi-­‐squared=31.64,	  df=4,	  p<0.001).	  In	  Table	  3b	  results	  also	  carry	  considerable	  significance	  from	  
such	  results	  (Chi-­‐squared=36.74,	  df=12,	  p<0.001).	  The	  important	  finding	  here	  is	  that	  again	  there	  is	  
support	  that	  the	  higher	  the	  litigant’s	  organizational	  level	  the	  more	  he	  or	  she	  will	  experience	  legal	  
success	  (H1).	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  Table	  3b	  classes	  showed	  a	  net	  advantage	  exceeding	  some	  other	  parties	  (by	  100%	  versus	  small	  
business,	  large	  business,	  and	  government),	  and	  voluntary	  organizations	  also	  enjoyed	  a	  better	  net	  
advantage	  over	  government	  (42.7%).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  these	  ‘successes’	  did	  not	  include	  
observations	  by	  which	  the	  ‘losing’	  organizational	  levels	  had	  any	  comparable	  net	  advantage	  (e.g.	  
there	  were	  no	  cases	  to	  compare	  in	  the	  matchups	  so	  the	  ‘loser’	  net	  advantages	  were	  already	  ‘0’).	  It	  is	  
safe	  to	  assume	  that	  these	  numbers	  would	  be	  different	  in	  cases	  whereby	  comparisons	  could	  be	  made	  
against	  more	  than	  just	  empty	  values	  for	  net	  advantage	  for	  these	  parties.	  These	  last	  findings	  at	  best	  
should	  be	  approached	  with	  caution.	  
 
Table	  3a.	  	  Net	  Advantage	  for	  Different	  Combinations	  of	  Parties	  (Songer-­‐type)	  
Combination	  of	  Parties	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   Net	  Advantage	  	   	   	  	  
Individual	   v.	  business	   	   	   	   	   Business	  by	  14.2%	  
Individual	   v.	  government	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   Government	  by	  47.6%	  
Business	   v.	  government	   	   	   	   	   ~~Business	  by	  33.3%	   	   	  
For	  the	  tables	  used	  to	  generate	  the	  data	  in	  the	  tables	  above	  N=434,	  Chi-­‐square=31.64,	  df=4,	  p<0.001.	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~~Comparison	  made	  in	  cases	  of	  zero	  observations	  for	  one	  of	  the	  listed	  parties	  
	  
Table	  3b.	  Net	  Advantage	  for	  Different	  Combinations	  of	  Parties	  (Expanded-­‐type)	  
Combination	  of	  Parties	  	  	   	   	   	   	   Net	  Advantage	  	   	  
Individual	   v.	  multiple	  individual	   	   	   	   Individuals	  by	  10%	   	   	  	  
Individual	   v.	  small	  business	   	   	   	   Individuals	  by	  2.4%	  
Individual	   v.	  large	  business	   	   	   	   Lg.	  Business	  by	  27.5%	  
Individuals	  	   v.	  government	   	   	   	   	   Government	  by	  42.2%	  
	  
Multiple	  Individuals	  	   v.	  small	  business	   	   	   Sm.	  Business	  by	  19.1%	  
Multiple	  Individuals.	   v.	  large	  business	   	   	   Lg.	  Business	  by	  30.3%	  
Multiple	  Individuals.	  	   v.	  government	   	   	   	   Government	  by	  46.7%	  
	  
Classes	   v.	  	   small	  business	   	   	   	   	   Classes	  by	  100%~~	  
Classes	   v.	  	   large	  business	   	   	   	   	   Classes	  by	  100%~~	  
Classes	  	  v.	  	   government	   	   	   	   	   Classes	  by	  100%~~	  
	  
Voluntary	  organizations	  v.	  government	   	   	   	   V.	  Organizations	  by	  50%~~	  
For	  the	  tables	  used	  to	  generate	  the	  data	  in	  the	  tables	  above	  N=434,	  Chi-­‐square=36.74,	  df=12,	  p<0.001.	  
~~	  Comparison	  made	  in	  cases	  of	  zero	  observations	  for	  one	  of	  the	  listed	  parties	  
	  In	  keeping	  with	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  (1992)	  and	  Wheeler	  et	  al	  (1987)	  the	  data	  in	  Tables	  3a	  and	  3b	  exclude	  cases	  where	  parties	  faced	  those	  
of	  the	  same	  organizational	  level.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  Another	  tabular	  comparison	  in	  Tables	  4a	  and	  4b	  shows	  the	  index	  of	  relative	  strength	  for	  litigants	  
who	  were	  opponents	  of	  different	  organizational	  levels;	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  also	  utilized	  this	  
comparison	  and	  again	  predicted	  a	  positive	  linear	  output	  for	  success	  and	  organizational	  strength	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(1992:246).	  Likewise,	  I	  use	  this	  measure	  to	  garner	  support	  for	  the	  research	  hypothesis	  (H2)	  that	  
the	  higher	  the	  difference	  of	  relative	  strength	  between	  litigants,	  the	  higher	  will	  be	  the	  appellant	  
success	  rates.	  Relative	  strength	  equals	  appellant	  minus	  respondent;	  this	  assumes	  one	  first	  assigns	  
each	  litigant	  to	  an	  organizational	  number	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  1	  to	  3	  for	  Songer-­‐type	  organizational	  
classification	  and	  1	  to	  7	  for	  the	  expanded-­‐type	  of	  organization.	  	  I	  obtained	  the	  indices	  finding	  the	  
difference	  of	  litigant	  organizational	  level	  in	  all	  cases	  that	  were	  wins	  (not	  ‘affirmed’)	  and	  reported	  
these	  with	  the	  winning	  percentages	  for	  each	  litigant	  class	  matchup.	  This	  measure	  in	  Table	  4a	  and	  
4b	  shows	  appellant	  success	  rates	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  relative	  organizational	  superiority	  (or	  inferiority).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  organizational	  strength	  variable	  shows	  the	  percentage	  tendency	  of	  winning	  for	  appellants	  
with	  the	  highest	  orders	  of	  organization	  (such	  as	  government,	  which	  was	  coded	  as	  ‘7’	  or	  ‘3’)	  
compared	  with	  every	  other	  organizational	  level.	  Conversely,	  it	  shows	  the	  winning	  tendencies	  for	  
lower	  organizational	  levels	  (such	  as	  individuals,	  coded	  ‘1’)	  against	  other	  classes,	  and	  it	  shows	  every	  
comparison	  of	  in-­‐between	  matchups	  (such	  as	  for	  business	  against	  other	  levels	  and	  classes	  and	  so	  
on).	  This	  is	  important	  because	  the	  success	  percentages	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  distribution	  of	  court	  
success	  by	  comparing	  each	  organizational	  class	  to	  every	  possible	  opponent.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  As	  already	  stated	  above	  and	  as	  mentioned	  by	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan,	  if	  a	  linear	  presentation	  of	  
increased	  rate	  of	  court	  success	  corresponds	  to	  an	  increasing	  relative	  strength	  index,	  the	  general	  
supposition	  is	  that	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  is	  supported.	  The	  highest	  and	  lowest	  index	  
differences	  in	  Tables	  4a	  and	  4b	  below	  correspond	  to	  the	  highest	  and	  lowest	  success	  rates	  
(government	  v.	  individual	  and	  individual	  v.	  government,	  respectively),	  and	  all	  relative	  strength	  
differences	  in	  Table	  4a	  follow	  a	  linear	  pattern	  with	  success,	  and	  that	  with	  considerable	  significance	  
(Chi-­‐square=87.68,	  df=8,	  p<0.001).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  intermediate	  relative	  strength	  
differences	  in	  Table	  4b	  do	  not	  occur	  in	  a	  completely	  linear	  fashion,	  thus	  creating	  an	  overall	  non-­‐
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linear	  result.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  this	  difference	  may	  result	  from	  something	  a	  more	  complex	  
organizational	  classification	  reveals	  and	  does	  not	  mean	  the	  tests	  do	  not	  offer	  theoretical	  support.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  summary,	  Table	  4a	  and	  Table	  4b	  show	  the	  least	  levels	  of	  success	  for	  individuals	  against	  
government	  (relative	  strength	  indices	  are	  -­‐2	  in	  Table	  4a	  and	  -­‐6	  in	  Table	  4b):	  at	  8%	  (N=250)	  and	  
7.8%	  (N=244),	  respectively.	  	  For	  the	  opposite	  extreme,	  government	  versus	  individuals	  actually	  
showed	  50%	  to	  55.6%	  success	  rates	  (considering	  both	  tables).	  Though	  these	  terminal	  ends	  of	  the	  
comparisons	  occur	  as	  expected,	  the	  intermediate	  values	  do	  not	  follow	  the	  same	  trend	  with	  
increasing	  success	  levels.	  The	  exception	  is	  in	  cases	  of	  	  ‘0’	  index	  relative	  strength:	  In	  both	  tables,	  the	  
levels	  of	  success	  matched	  with	  this	  value	  are	  somewhat	  lower	  (in	  Table	  4b	  at	  16.7%)	  and	  
somewhat	  higher	  (Table	  4b	  at	  20.5%)	  than	  a	  linear	  expectation	  would	  predict.	  Thus,	  when	  
considering	  Table	  4b,	  one	  can	  see	  the	  results	  are	  non-­‐linear	  for	  the	  expanded	  organizational	  
classification.	  Particularly,	  only	  7.8%	  success	  accompanies	  the	  relative	  strength	  index	  of	  -­‐6	  
(individual	  v.	  government),	  and	  the	  intermediate	  range	  of	  indices	  -­‐3	  to	  -­‐5	  follow	  with	  22.5%	  
success,	  while	  an	  index	  of	  -­‐1	  coincides	  with	  12.5%	  success.	  For	  relative	  strength	  indices	  of	  0	  
difference	  in	  litigant	  organizational	  levels,	  the	  percentage	  jumps	  to	  20.5%,	  while	  +1	  to	  +2	  coincides	  
with	  17.6%,	  and	  the	  range	  of	  +3	  to	  +5	  comes	  at	  second	  place,	  at	  40%	  success,	  just	  below	  the	  rate	  for	  
+6	  (government	  v.	  individual)	  which	  scored	  50%	  success.	  These	  findings	  are	  quite	  significant,	  
(N=434,	  Chi-­‐square=192.75,	  df=6,	  p<0.001),	  and	  though	  this	  distribution	  does	  not	  conform	  to	  that	  
of	  prior	  researchers’	  linear	  expectations,	  its	  difference	  is	  important,	  as	  it	  may	  justify	  further	  
exploration	  through	  more	  intensive	  study	  due	  to	  the	  more	  complex	  organizational	  classification.	  
	  
Table	  4a.	  	  Appellant	  Success	  by	  Relative	  Strength	  Index	  (Songer-­‐type	  Organization)	   	  
Index	  of	  Relative	  Strength	   	   	   	   Appellant	  Wins	   	   	   	  
(Appellant	  –	  Respondent)	   	   	   	   	   %	   	   	   (N)	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-­‐2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   8%	   	   	   250	   	  
-­‐1	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   21.7%	   	   	   	  	  83	   	  
0	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   16.7%	   	   	   	  	  72	  
+1	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   35%	   	   	   	  	  20	  
+2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   55.6%	   	   	   	  	  	  	  9	  
For	  the	  table	  used	  to	  generate	  the	  data	  frequencies	  in	  the	  table	  above	  N=434,	  Chi-­‐square=87.68,	  df=8,	  p<0.001.	  
 
Table	  4b.	  Appellant	  Success	  by	  Relative	  Strength	  Index	  (Expanded-­‐type	  
Organization)	  
Index	  of	  Relative	  Strength	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Appellant	  Wins	   	   	   (N)	  
(Appellant	  –	  Respondent)	  
-­‐6	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   7.8%	   	   	   244	   	  
-­‐5	  to	  -­‐3	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   22.5%	   	   	   	  	  	  71	  
-­‐2	  to	  -­‐1	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   12.5%	   	   	   	  	  	  32	  
0	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   20.5%	   	   	   	  	  	  44	  
+1	  to	  +2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   17.6%	   	   	   	  	  	  17	  
+3	  to	  +5	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   40%	   	   	   	  	  	  20	   	  
+6	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   50%	   	   	   	  	  	  	  6	  
For	  the	  table	  used	  to	  generate	  the	  data	  frequencies	  in	  the	  table	  above	  N=434,	  Chi-­‐square=192.75,	  df=6,	  p<0.001.	  
	  
Advantage	  of	  Civil	  over	  Criminal	  Cases	  
	  	  	  	  	  A	  final	  comparison	  in	  Table	  5	  offers	  some	  support	  for	  Black’s	  theoretical	  prediction	  that	  civil	  
cases	  will	  prevail	  in	  terms	  of	  appellant	  successes	  over	  criminal	  ones	  (H3).	  Table	  5	  contains	  a	  
modified	  display	  of	  win	  rates	  for	  organizational	  classes,	  calculated	  by	  removing	  from	  it	  all	  criminal	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cases	  so	  that	  only	  civil	  (TCR)	  style	  cases	  remain.	  The	  results	  show	  a	  favorable	  success	  rate	  for	  most	  
classes	  engaged	  in	  civil	  proceedings;	  the	  case	  type	  division	  was	  not	  too	  distant	  from	  an	  even	  split,	  
with	  47%	  civil	  cases	  and	  53%	  criminal	  ones.	  For	  civil	  cases,	  22.2%	  were	  wins	  (N=203,	  Chi-­‐
squared=38.88,	  df=24,	  p=0.03),	  while	  the	  remaining	  criminal	  cases	  reflected	  only	  a	  7.4%	  success	  
rate,	  reflecting	  substantial	  significance	  (N=231,	  Chi-­‐squared=184.24,	  df=24,	  p<0.001),	  thus	  
garnering	  support	  for	  Black’s	  theoretical	  framework	  and	  the	  research	  hypothesis	  (H3)	  that	  civil	  
appeals	  will	  realize	  greater	  success	  than	  criminal	  ones.	  
	  	  
Table	  5a.	  	  	  	  Win	  Rate	  (%)	  for	  Appellants	  in	  Civil	  Proceedings	  vs.	  Other	  Classes	  of	  
Opponents	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Limitations	  and	  Future	  Research	  
	  
	  	  	  	  Perhaps	  the	  single	  greatest	  limitation	  in	  the	  current	  study	  is	  that	  it	  only	  includes	  for	  analysis	  
cases	  from	  a	  two-­‐year	  period	  from	  West	  Virginia	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeals.	  Additionally,	  and	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  time	  constraints,	  the	  study	  includes	  only	  criminal	  and	  civil	  actions,	  which	  necessarily	  
excludes	  a	  large	  volume	  of	  appeals	  cases	  ruled	  upon	  during	  the	  same	  time	  period.	  Though	  
somewhat	  useful	  for	  comparing	  varying	  degrees	  of	  	  litigant	  organizational	  level	  (as	  these	  levels	  
generally	  only	  vary	  in	  civil	  proceedings),	  this	  case	  selection	  choice	  involves	  a	  limitation	  of	  case	  
styles	  based	  on	  a	  lack	  of	  serious	  time	  and	  resources	  with	  which	  to	  sample	  and	  analyze	  a	  large	  frame	  
of	  data.	  Since	  I	  determined	  it	  was	  best	  to	  narrow	  this	  study’s	  chronological	  frame	  to	  the	  given	  West	  
Virginia	  courts	  data	  due	  to	  time	  limits,	  a	  future	  study	  may	  widen	  the	  case	  type	  and	  the	  time	  frame	  
covered	  in	  order	  to	  address	  this	  deficiency.	  It	  would	  be	  advantageous	  and	  prudent	  to	  select	  from	  
multiple	  state	  courts	  and	  perhaps	  several	  federal	  supreme	  courts	  venues,	  from	  higher	  tribunals	  
such	  as	  international	  organizations	  to	  which	  governments	  are	  subordinate	  or	  accountable,	  and	  
from	  wider	  time	  frames.	  This	  would	  allow	  for	  a	  longitudinal	  analysis	  and	  a	  more	  representative	  
data	  set,	  as	  well	  as	  cases	  involving	  litigants	  having	  higher	  levels	  of	  organization.	  One	  such	  way	  of	  
doing	  this	  may	  be	  in	  formulating	  a	  content	  analysis	  of	  legal	  decisions	  involving	  international	  law	  
and	  large	  corporate	  entities	  over	  time	  (as	  in	  recent	  cases	  such	  as	  energy	  conglomerate	  Vattenfall’s	  
2012	  civil	  actions	  that	  won	  an	  excess	  of	  10	  million	  Euros	  against	  the	  German	  government	  for	  
statutory	  restrictions	  of	  the	  former’s	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  operations).	  Additionally,	  future	  studies	  
could	  further	  explore	  the	  compared	  win	  rates	  of	  civil	  versus	  criminal	  cases,	  consider	  a	  business	  
advantage	  question,	  and	  perhaps	  test	  a	  research	  question	  regarding	  social	  distance	  (morphology)	  
of	  litigants	  versus	  court	  success,	  assuming	  that	  such	  detail	  could	  be	  gathered	  from	  other	  data	  sets.	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Conclusion	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  pursuit	  of	  empirical	  tests	  of	  both	  Black’s	  theoretical	  propositions	  and	  of	  Galanter’s	  predictions	  
about	  organization	  and	  the	  resultant	  conditions	  of	  the	  law,	  this	  research	  did	  obtain	  some	  support	  
thereof.	  The	  	  overall	  finding	  was	  that	  individuals	  with	  higher	  organizational	  levels	  were	  more	  
successful	  in	  West	  Virginia	  appeals,	  and	  those	  of	  the	  lower	  organizational	  classes	  were	  less	  
successful.	  Aside	  from	  obvious	  differences	  in	  data	  selection,	  I	  set	  out	  to	  replicate	  as	  much	  as	  
possible	  the	  approach	  of	  Songer	  and	  Sheehan	  in	  their	  1992	  study.	  I	  discovered	  that	  an	  expanded	  
and	  more	  complex	  organizational	  level	  classification	  scheme	  (such	  as	  was	  used	  here)	  may	  reveal	  a	  
different	  than	  expected	  pattern	  in	  data	  findings	  regarding	  court	  success	  and	  litigant	  strength.	  
Though	  the	  study	  results	  here	  did	  not	  follow	  a	  completely	  linear	  pattern	  of	  variation,	  clearly	  the	  
highest	  order	  of	  success	  was	  paired	  with	  the	  highest	  order	  of	  organization:	  government.	  
Conversely,	  the	  least	  organized	  party,	  individuals,	  corresponded	  with	  the	  lowest	  level	  of	  success	  by	  
the	  relative	  strength	  measure	  and	  in	  general	  results;	  these	  findings	  generally	  supported	  the	  
theoretical	  framework.	  It	  was	  the	  strength	  indexes	  in	  the	  in-­‐between	  bounds	  of	  the	  range	  of	  
organizational	  level	  that	  demarcated	  from	  a	  linear	  progression;	  that	  these	  values	  digressed	  may	  
hold	  some	  worth	  for	  future	  investigations	  with	  more	  complex	  designations	  of	  litigant	  organization.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Additionally,	  my	  research	  compared	  the	  success	  rates	  for	  civil	  versus	  criminal	  cases	  and	  also	  
garnered	  support	  for	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  Donald	  Black.	  Accordingly,	  I	  had	  correctly	  
assumed	  that	  civil	  cases	  would	  have	  lower	  affirmation	  rates	  (higher	  success)	  due	  to	  the	  implied	  
greater	  differences	  in	  organizational	  statuses	  of	  litigants	  in	  criminal	  cases.	  Civil	  cases	  showed	  
significantly	  higher	  levels	  of	  success	  than	  criminal	  ones	  (22%	  v.	  7.8%;	  p<0.05).	  Though	  the	  breadth	  
of	  the	  research	  frame	  in	  this	  study	  was	  limited,	  its	  outcome	  lays	  some	  groundwork	  for	  a	  more	  
thorough	  project.	  More	  details	  about	  organization	  and	  examination	  of	  a	  research	  question	  based	  on	  
race	  or	  socioeconomic	  status	  could	  also	  allow	  for	  a	  widened	  frame	  of	  theoretical	  questioning.	  While	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a	  socioeconomic	  question	  may	  be	  appropriate	  in	  a	  West	  Virginia-­‐based	  study,	  to	  consider	  factors	  of	  
race	  may	  prove	  more	  fruitful	  in	  another	  state,	  perhaps	  in	  the	  southeastern	  United	  States	  or	  in	  urban	  
areas	  reflecting	  more	  diverse	  demographic	  features.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Generally	  stated,	  one	  should	  bring	  clout	  to	  the	  courtroom	  in	  West	  Virginia’s	  Appellate	  Courts,	  
whether	  by	  means	  of	  organizational	  status,	  superior	  legal	  representation,	  or	  amici	  influence	  or	  
some	  combination	  thereof.	  It	  is	  clout	  that	  is	  largely	  thought	  to	  represent	  organizational	  advantage	  
in	  West	  Virginia	  and	  elsewhere.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Jean-­‐Jacques	  Rousseau	  said	  that	  inequality	  is	  harmless	  to	  the	  social	  order	  in	  general,	  so	  long	  as	  
this	  difference	  and	  disparity	  is	  not	  too	  noticeable.	  It	  is	  after	  inequality	  grows	  beyond	  subtle	  notice	  
that	  problems	  will	  begin	  and	  persist	  (Rousseau	  2010[1913]).	  Ultimately	  one	  may	  argue	  that	  City	  
Hall	  perpetuates	  inequality	  in	  serving	  itself,	  and	  that	  one	  can’t	  fight	  City	  Hall	  and	  win	  in	  most	  cases	  
because	  its	  inherent	  organizational	  advantage	  (and	  perhaps	  other	  factors	  not	  investigated	  here)	  
will	  undoubtedly	  assure	  its	  victory.	  	  
	  	  	  	  I	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  imply	  that	  one	  can’t	  fight	  City	  Hall	  or	  the	  established	  order	  through	  law,	  or	  that	  
one	  should	  not	  try.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  is	  exactly	  because	  of	  the	  unleveled	  legal	  playing	  field	  that	  one	  
needs	  to	  pursue	  fair	  treatment	  of	  the	  law.	  The	  intent	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  show	  that	  the	  relationship	  of	  
status	  and	  legal	  favor	  is	  a	  complex	  one,	  and	  it	  warrants	  both	  future	  research	  and	  likely	  subsequent	  
reforms.	  Findings	  in	  future	  studies	  may	  further	  determine	  that	  the	  key	  determinant	  of	  court	  success	  
is	  organization	  in	  its	  varying	  degrees	  and	  that	  the	  best	  contenders	  before	  the	  law	  are	  those	  of	  the	  
highest	  organizational	  status	  when	  race	  and	  other	  factors	  come	  into	  play.	  Ultimately	  it	  is	  the	  
expectation	  here	  that	  circumstances	  will	  continue	  to	  favor	  the	  haves,	  the	  upper-­‐dogs,	  and	  the	  
privileged	  membership	  of	  City	  Hall,	  and	  change	  must	  occur	  in	  the	  name	  of	  legal	  egalitarianism.	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